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Introduction
A central requirement for dependability−critical systems is the ability to cope with faults. It is important that this non−functional property can be validated before the system is licensed for use in applications that affect, for instance, human life. This requires a quantitative dependability analysis, which deals, for instance, with error coverage, mean duration of a recovery cycle, the probability of tolerating certain state perturbations, or the probability of a failure. For such an analysis, it is not only necessary to model the system's behavior; e.g. the embedded control algorithm. Also the system's interac− tion with its environment via sensors and actuators has to be modeled (closed−loop modeling), since the environ− ment can be a source of faults which can give rise to errors in the system's behavior. Thus, dependability evaluation of embedded systems tends to be very com− plex causing the modeling problem to be notoriously elusive and error prone.
Therefore, when modeling embedded systems a trade−off has to be made between the degree of details in modeling and the degree of possible automation of the analysis.
This lead us to define a sub−class of statecharts comprising so−called Guarded Statecharts (GSC) [6] . Statecharts or state diagrams [10] represent finite state machines and describe the behavior of objects in response to external stimuli, such as sensor signals. Statecharts model reactive, state−driven system behavior. They are, however, not directly amenable to a quantitative analysis. Therefore, a method has to be introduced which transforms a set of concurrent statecharts into a mathematical model that can be evaluated quantitatively. Suitable mathematical models could be a directly generated transition system or a Petri Net. In this paper we present a technique for transforming Guarded Statecharts, consistent with UML semantics, into a set of interacting Stochastic Reward Nets (SRN) [4] . Stochastic Reward Nets are extensions to Generalized Stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN) [1] . GSPNs generalize Petri Nets by assigning a firing rate to each transition. On the one hand, this gives us the possibility to employ the elaborate and well established Petri Net tools for the quantitative analysis of UML−models. On the other hand, this integrates the use of Petri Nets into the object− oriented modeling paradigm of UML. For example, the generated Petri Nets models can be extended by model− ing aspects, difficult to express directly in UML, like the loss or spurious generation of signals (cf. Section 4).
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the notion of Guarded Statecharts. In Section 3 it is shown how faults and errors can be modeled by defining appropriate fault/error models. The transformation to
Guarded Statecharts
The main objects of a Guarded Statechart are states (container states, basic states, initial states, etc.) and transitions with guards. In addition, labels of transitions describe timing information, e.g. arrival distribution of signals, or static information, e.g. probabilities of possible outcomes.
Guarded Statecharts: Given a set E of external event variables, a Guarded Statechart (GSC) is a finite set A of actions and a finite set S of states. Each state and each event has a name. Actions denote state transitions. Figure 1 .
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Figure 1 Action
With GSCs also non−deterministic behavior can be modeled. This is important, since although the software of embedded systems is completely deterministic, the system can not know if and when external events or faults will occur. For instance, a task can be requested at Figure 2) . A state representing an actuator signal being active means that the actuator is set to a certain discrete value. Analogous, if a component is in a state which represents a sensor signal, it means that this sensor is set.
In GSC−models, hardware and software components are only allowed to communicate via such sensor and actuator states. This interaction is expressed by guard expressions containing predicates over sensor or actuator states (public states). Likewise, interactions between tasks of the control software are also modeled by guarded state transitions. This corresponds to an asynchronous synchronization pattern between tasks. This pattern is inherently multithreaded, because it models a message being passed to another object without the yielding of control [9] .
Figure 2 Modeling view
The following steps lead to a model of an embedded system and its environment which comprises controllers and the controlled units interacting by sensors and actuators. 
Modeling Faults and Errors
Truly dependable systems are able to cope with faults. Following types and locations of a fault can be distinguish. Design faults can exist in hardware and software. In fact the co−design paradigm is gradually making hardware and software indistinguishable. Certain physical faults occur inside a single component of the system and can be handled by that component. Some physical faults occur inside a component but must be handled by another component. External faults occur in the environment and are often transient ( Figure 3 ). Faults can give rise to errors, that is to undesired system states, which in turn can lead to the failure of the system [13] .
Augmenting the system model with a realistic fault model is the basis for the dependability analysis. [5, 7, 8, 12] .
Figure 3 Faults
Signal losses can cause that guards are not observed. For example, the guard in(RHW_off) may not be observed by the robot control. The guard then always evaluates to TRUE. This way, also sensor and actuator faults or loss of messages can easily be modeled by state perturbations.
Finally, using guards also dependability requirements, expressed as negations of fault trees over component states, can be integrated into GSCs. This way, depend− ability requirements, resulting from the requirement analysis, can directly be integrated into the system model. For instance, a fault tree defining possible colli− sions of certain devices, that could lead to the failure can be specified as guard expression, see Figure 4 .
From Statecharts to Stochastic Reward Nets
For a dependability analysis the GSC−models must be transformed to models amenable to mathematical analysis. Guarded Statechart can easily be transformed into Stochastic Reward Nets (SRN 
An Example
We illustrate our approach by a small example of a fault−tolerant system. The example is a variation of a production cell model [14, 16] . The system contains a press that processes metal blanks, a robot with an extensible arm (with a electromagnet) for loading and unloading the press, and a repair console. The feed belt as well as the deposit belt are not modeled explicitly. The breakdown of the press can be sensed by the repair console. Then the repairman (worker) can repair the press. Also the robot arm may stuck and then be repaired by the repairman.
According to our modeling approach, each device model consists of a hardware behavioral model and the corre− sponding control charts. The control charts specify either the behavior of a single, central cell controller or that of several distributed device controllers. The complete GSC−model comprises 5 statecharts (with 9 state transition diagrams and 34 basic states, of which 8 are sensor states and 8 are actuator states). These statecharts have to be transformed to SRNs for analysis [6] . Figures  6 and 7 show the statecharts of the robot. We use the UML−modeling tool INNOVATOR [17].
The HW−statechart contains 4 sensor states representing the positions of the robot arm and the on/off−state of the magnet. The 5th sensor state represents a perturbation: the failure of the robot arm to retract ( Figure 6 ). The GSC of the robot control ( Figure 7 ) contains 2 state tran− sition diagrams: a diagram specifying the communication with the press control and the repair console, and a diagram specifying the control of the robot arm. The states RC_si are actuator states. Also a loss rate for signal s6 is specified. The robot control repeats sending this signal until it is received by the hardware.
The complete UML−model of an extended version of this example is given in [11] . It comprises a requirement model, an object model, a deployment model and packages.
• The requirement model describes the requirements to the modeled system. It contains use case diagrams and sequence diagrams. [ RC_s5] / rate=1
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Figure 7 Robot control
The static view of the system is captured in class, object and deployment diagrams.
• The object model of the production cell is organized around the four object diagrams: ProductionCell, Controllers, Environment, and Machines. • The deployment model consists of several deploy− ment diagrams of the system. A deployment diagram describes a possible architecture of the system and shows a given assignment of the components to the nodes; e.g. centralized or distributed control.
• The package model of the production cell consists of three packages and a package diagram. The Machines package includes the nodes of the system that repre− sent the physical machines. The Controllers package contains the nodes of the system that represent the physical controllers. The third package contains the components of the system that describe the system's functionality.
The dynamic view of the system is given by the statecharts.
Quantitative Results
Some measurements with the transformed models were performed which provided useful experiences [11] . For the quantitative analysis our SRN−tool PANDA was used. The transformed GSC−model of our small example has 63000 states. However, the components are strongly coupled by the guards; 9316 states are reachable from the initial configuration.
With PANDA we can • detect absorbing states of the system or of its components, [RC_idle]/ rate=10
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• determine the number of reachable states of the system, • determine the expected number of firings of a given transition until an given point in time, • determine the expected time the system spends in a given state until a given point in time.
• etc. From these data performance and dependability measures (defined by reward functions) like throughput, utiliza− tion, mean turn−around time, reliability, availability, etc. can be derived. Figures 8 and 9 show the utilization of the repairman as function of elapsed time and the throughput of the production cell as function of the signal loss rate. The throughput is the mean number of forged blanks per time unit (1 sec). 
Scenarios
The analysis of GSC−models needs either high perfor− mance computers or is very time consuming, and even a little more realistic model then that of [11] would cause problems. But in practice the complexity of our (extended) model is near the maximal complexity modern tools can handle. Thus, we have, most probably, to concentrate our quantitative analysis on certain system components such as the embedded controllers. The controllers are modeled in greater details whereas the devices need not be modeled with details. For a dependability analysis it may only be necessary to specify how they develop state perturbations. Another way to reduce complexity is to deduce from the GSC−model certain scenarios and to model them by se− quence diagrams. Usually these sequence diagrams are much less complex than the GSC−model itself. We transform then the sequence diagrams to SRNs ( Figure  10 ) and, first, check whether the scenario works, e.g. we check whether it is deadlock−free. Then we determine the probability, that the scenario terminates after a given time. For example, the sequence diagram which de− scribes the break−down of the robot arm and its repair is given in Figure 11 . The corresponding SRN has only 51 places, 31 transitions, and 15 reachable states. Figure 13 , derived from this scenario, shows the distri− bution function of the time it takes to load the press again after the breakdown of the robot arm. Figure 12 shows the scenario where the signals from the robot control are lost twice and Figure 14 presents the distribution func− tions of the duration of the fault−free scenario (1) and the faulty scenario (2). 
Conclusion
We presented a modeling paradigm for dependability− critical embedded systems and an approach to evaluate the models quantitatively. Our starting point is an object−oriented UML−model of the embedded system. The target are analytical Stochastic Reward Nets amenable to a quantitative analysis. This way the possibility of UML to model and analyze error−prone and fault−tolerant system behavior is greatly enhanced. [rate=10] RC_s5
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